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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect on the market valuation of large Dutch firms following the
announcement of forming international strategic alliances (ISAs). These stock market effects
are distinguished by type of alliance and country of origin of the partnering firms during the
period 1985-1992. While ISAs are generally found to have a positive effect on firms’ market
value, strategically and culturally distant foreign partners generate a strong negative effect on a
firm’s market value. The results underscore the importance of conducting a strategic,
operational and cultural audit of the partnering firms and the envisaged partnership. The audit
needs to be taken as a starting point in developing the essential co-operation skills to make the
alliance work and should become integrated within a comprehensive performance scorecard.4
INTRODUCTION
International strategic alliances (ISAs) have become increasingly important to the
modern economic organization of global markets. There is a growing literature analysing the
use, organization, and managerial assessment of alliances in various international strategic
settings. In practice, however, the majority of firms do not systematically track the
performance of their ISA, nor relate it to their strategic objectives, despite the fact that
investors often tend to react strongly to the announcement of an ISA
1. Scholarly research on
ISAs has mostly examined their impact on the stock market value of the partnering firms
2.
This research has most often taken a US perspective and focused on the type of alliance, the
sector, the size, and the experience of the firms. Important differences are found with respect
to the type of alliance in terms of shared activity (marketing, technology) and formal structure.
For instance, it has been found that 1) announcements of technological alliances generate
greater returns than marketing alliance announcements, 2) related joint ventures are expected
to perform better than unrelated joint ventures, and 3) abnormal returns are negatively
correlated with profitability and size. Because of the strong focus on ISAs among US firms,
the effect of the diversity of the partners in terms of their national origin has largely been
ignored.
This study focuses on ISAs concluded during the period 1985-1992 by large Dutch
firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (see appendix I for a description of the data).
A study of Dutch firms over the period 1985-1992 is particularly interesting because at that
time Dutch firms were witnessing strong market integration in Europe, which offered
unknown opportunities to strengthen competitiveness and reorganize activities. Because of the
replication of most activities in the fragmented markets of the EU and their limited presence
outside Europe, especially Asia, Dutch firms, had to deal with strong scale and scope
disadvantages compared to their American and Japanese competitors. We believe that our
analysis can be easily extended to firms from other EU Member States and may offer major
insights for firms setting up alliances with firms from those central and Eastern countries
which soon will join the EU.5
VALUE CREATION THROUGH ISA
From a strategic perspective ISAs create value through combining resources that
complement each other and can be leveraged in global markets. The use of an ISA by firms
should therefore be integrated within their overall corporate strategy. However, not all features
of an ISA can be decided before its establishment, and the choice and selection of a partner is
most often the subject of a bounded search process among limited market opportunities. The
difficulty in finding an international partner may help explain that ISAs are often an emergent
process rather than a well planned strategic decision-making process. These arguments imply
that forming an ISA will convey important new information about the strategic potential of a
firm, and hence is expected to have an important impact on the value of that firm.
While the complementarities and leveraging of valuable resources constitutes
necessary conditions to create value, the partnership requires key collaborative skills to foster
and manage the relationships between the partnering firms and the interface with the joint
activity or joint venture. Studies have identified three key skills for a successful ISA
3:
diplomatic vision, acceptance of other cultures, and shared objectives and vision. These skills
are essentially interacting with four levels of influence: the national/macro background of the
partnering firms, the industry environment, the organisation of the firm, and individual
manager perceptions. Our study focuses on the first and second influences to identify whether
the country of origin of the partner, encompassing its strategic, institutional and cultural
context, contributes to the value created by an ISA.
Not all ISAs are aimed at expanding the operations of firms. An important number of
ISAs are used as instruments to restructure and downscale business units. ISAs most often
provide firms with real options to further expand or divest business units in a global context.
Examination of US-Japanese alliances during the 1980’s, found that the typical US-Japanese
alliance corresponded to “a call option on portfolio reconfiguration for the Japanese firm and a
put option on financial restructuring for its US partner”
4. ISA were preferred to immediate
divesture of less profitable divisions, as firms expected to improve the final acquisition terms
by combining resources with the partnering firm through the ISA. Many of the Dutch firms
appeared to be facing similar financial pressure to restructure in the late 80’s. Access to
Japanese and other Asian markets and business systems, from where growing competition was
coming, pressed many Dutch firms to set up ISAs with Japanese and Asian firms
5.6
An illustrating case: Philips NV
A prominent electronics firm in our database, Philips  NV, has been particularly hurt
by strong global competition and its relatively weak presence in Asia in the eighties. In 1990,
the Dutch electronics firm seemed close to collapse. In order to drastically restructure its
global operations, the company developed a string of global joint ventures. Many of these
joint ventures, including the better-known Whirlpool-Philips joint venture hosting Philips’
white goods division, comprised a fade out option through which the company was able to
divest the division gradually over time. More recently, after a failed joint venture with the US
firm Lucent technology to massively penetrate the US digital mobile market in the late
nineties and facing a weakening position in Europe, Philips decided in June 2001 to be no
longer an independent maker of mobile phones, but to manufacture them in a joint venture
with China Electronic Corporation. The latter group obtained the controlling stake in the joint
venture. At the same time, using its own costumer sales and distribution channels, and
transferring technology to the joint venture, Philips expects to significantly increase its
market share in China, the fastest growing market.
Following the announcement of the joint venture on June 26, 2001 shares in Philips
were down 3 per cent. Analysts reacted negatively to this restructuring decision, as they
expect Philips’ position to become weaker in Europe and the company to potentially face
problems similar to what they experienced with the Masushita joint venture in a recent past
(IDG Net Techwire, www.thestandard.com). Having been faced with many restrictions to
invest in Japan, Philips held a 35 percent stake in a joint venture with Matsushita, Matsushita
Electronics Corporation (MEC), until 1993. Philips provided MEC with technology for
cathode ray tubes and lighting, but MEC's operations remained limited to manufacturing and
played no role in the increasing penetration of Philips-branded products in Japan. Over time,
Matsushita obtained equal or superior technological capabilities in a substantial number of
MEC's product lines.7
Discord arose between Philips and Matsushita on how to implement MEC's overseas
expansion, in particular over semiconductor sales and production in the US (where Philips’
subsidiary Signetics is manufacturing) and cathode ray tube production in China and Europe
(where Philips also has its own manufacturing plants). In 1993, Philips, which was troubled
by a large debt burden and in the midst of a painful rationalisation process, indicated it would
prefer to pull out of the venture. Matsushita eventually agreed to buy out Philips' stake for
185 billion Yen (about 1.65 billion US$). The buyout left Matsushita free to pursue its own
strategy abroad and to compete head-on with Philips outside Japan.
While the previous examples illustrate cases of forced restructuring, Philips has set up
many other alliances and joint ventures in the wide portfolio of its activities that clearly
offered the company strong growth options. For instance, through a series of strategically
well-chosen joint ventures and acquisitions Philips Medical Systems has been showing a
remarkable strong growth in this line of business. In 1997 Philips entered into a joint venture
with the German based Siemens Medical Engineering division and the French headquartered
Thales Electronic Devices to develop and manufacture a new generation of flat digital
detectors for X-ray imaging systems.
More recently, Philips Medical Systems and the Israeli based SHL Telemedicine
established the joint venture Philips Heartcare Telemedicine Services Europe. From its strong
position in Europe, and through recent acquisitions of Marconi's Medical Systems business
and Agilent's Healthcare Solutions Group, Philips has in a short span of time grown into the
world's second largest manufacturer of medical diagnostic imaging equipment.
Strategic alliances and stock returns: partner location effects
Considering the various motives and types of ISAs, it is not surprising that statistical
studies have found divergent stock market reactions to the announcement of an ISA. In this
context positive stock market reactions have been found for ISAs that are used to increase
strategic flexibility or the firm’s long-term investment possibilities, whereas negative
reactions have been observed for ISAs involving the closing of plants
6, and unplanned
divestitures
7. Similarly, in contrast to expansionary business relocations, a negative effect on
the value of the firm has been found for relocation announcements motivated by capacity
reduction or consolidation operation.8
Finally, systematic differences have been found between technological alliances and
marketing alliances, with technological alliances found to have a greater positive effect
8. This
differential effect is attributed to the market’s perception of technological alliances having
more option value for generating new activities and future income streams, whereas
marketing alliances often involve deals to share markets in mature industries.
Since most previous studies have dealt with domestic alliances or specific industry
case studies, country of origin differences between partners have received limited attention
and have not been formally addressed in statistical testing. This is surprising given the
arguments outlined above. There are several reasons why the country of origin of the
partnering firms might be expected to have a significant impact on firm values. First, the
more economically and culturally distant the partner the higher the transactional and strategic
risks to manage the alliance, especially when the essential skills to cope with these risks are
lacking
9. Second, performance standards of partners based in different parts of the world may
strongly differ, as they reflect differences in social norms, regulations, and governance
structures
10. Third, the search for suitable partners in an ISA is a costly and uncertain process.
As a result, many ISAs are unexpected and largely determined by sudden opportunities
11. The
choice of a foreign partner originating from a less familiar national background adds to this
effect and creates extra risk that the alliance will quickly dissolve. In line with the previous
three arguments, research has found that joint ventures dissolve more quickly the more
culturally distant the (Dutch) firm is from the partnering firm
12. Fourth, the country of origin
of the partner most often reflects the competitive position of the partner and, as such, the type
of growth option acquired by the firm through the ISA. Within this process, investors
rationally expect the stronger partner to acquire the call option to expand while the weaker
partner acquires the put option to sell off divisions or certain activities
13. Clearly, as
mentioned above, the market will react very differently, following this type of information.
Methodology
Our empirical analysis uses standard equity-capital event methods to compute
abnormal returns to traded equity following the announcement of an ISA
14. Under semi-
strong form efficiency of capital markets, an assumption supported by the finance literature,
stock prices reflect all publicly available information. If the formation of a strategic alliance
provides information that causes an upward or downward revaluation of the firm's expected9
future earnings, then the stock price will reflect this as soon as the information becomes
public through the formal announcement of the alliance. Therefore, announcement events are
expected to be correlated with the deviations of actual returns from the predicted returns,
based on the firm's historical return.
The abnormal returns are calculated as the residuals of the standard market model
(CAPM) calculated over 75 days. These abnormal returns are cumulated over a window
starting 8 days before the event day. Since the announcement of a strategic alliance is mostly
preceded by rumours and reports about intensified negotiations between the partners, it is
reasonable to expect observable stock price effects some days before the actual announcement
date. Further, since the announcements are taken from newspapers and do not come from
wire data, the exact announcement date of the ISA is not known and may already have taken
place some days before being reported in the newspaper
15. For both these reasons, a pre-event
window spanning some days before the announcement date needs to be analysed to ensure
that the reaction of the stock market to (rumours of) the announcement are fully taken into
account in the analysis of abnormal returns. As stated, here we use a pre-event window
starting 8 days prior to the announcement (changing the length of the window did not
significantly change the results).
A standard t-test
16 is used to determine whether the abnormal returns are significantly
different from zero. Because parametric test statistics are rather sensitive to outliers,
especially in small samples
17, and other related statistical problems including
heteroscedasticity and an event induced shift in variance
18, nonparametric tests were also
applied and yielded similar evidence
19.10
RESULTS
Insert Table 1 About Here
Table 1 shows that the most important abnormal returns are found for strategic
alliances of Dutch firms with Japanese firms. In this case, the t-statistic rejects the null-
hypothesis of no effect at least at the 10% level. For Dutch-Japanese ISAs the cumulative
abnormal return is equal to a loss of 3.65 percent which suggests a strong effect that is
identified early by the market. This result is similar to what other studies found for US firms
partnering with Japanese firms in that same period
20. ISAs with non-European firms, which
are competitively and culturally distant, generally lead to negative market valuations.
Alliances with US based firms that are competitively and culturally less distant than Japanese
following Hofstede’s
21 metric do not have a significant effect on the stock returns of the
Dutch partner. Strategic alliances with firms based in other European countries show a clear
positive effect (about 2 percent in the pre-announcement period). This positive response is the
strongest for production and marketing alliances, suggesting strong strategic growth options
from efficiency gains and market strengthening gains resulting from a better co-ordination of
activities in the emerging single market of Europe.
Insert Table 2 About Here
As a further analysis of our data, Table 2 shows the results of an analysis of variance
by means of a regression relating CARs (cumulative abnormal returns) to a set of dummy
variables reflecting the country or region of origin of the partnering firms. The base region is
taken as Europe (intercept value), so that the coefficients for the other country variables are
the difference in the mean CAR for ISAs with a partner from the particular country versus an
ISA with a partner from Europe. All F-tests reject the null hypothesis of no differences
between the mean CAR response across the country of origin at a significance level of 5
percent or less. Table 2 shows that the most marked differences in mean response are found
for Japanese and European alliances. There are also large differences in CARs between11
European alliances and alliances with firms based outside the Triad (EU, US and Japan)
22.
From the cross-sectional analysis it is clear that EU alliances have a positive impact on the
stock market returns of the Dutch partner
23. In comparison to alliances with a European
partner, partnerships with a non-European firm produce smaller cumulative abnormal returns.
The differences in CARs when compared with European alliances are significantly larger for
alliances with a Japanese partner than they are for partnerships with US based firms.
We further distinguished technological ISAs with Japanese partners (the ones with the
most significant returns) according to their long run status, i.e. alliances where the Dutch
partner’s line of business was acquired in a later stage by the Japanese partner versus those
where the alliance was still going on, or terminated without further co-operation.
Interestingly, the latter category represented only 30 % of the technological alliances with
Japanese firms so that 70% ended in the acquisition by the Japanese partner while no
alliances involved acquisitions by Dutch firms. We found no significant difference in the
mean response between the two sets of alliances.
The testing was extended to cover other characteristics of the alliances including the
sectoral scope of the alliances, the relative size of both partners, profitability, and the alliance
intensity. Controlling for these factors did not change the nationality findings and added only
marginally to the total explained variation
24.
Managerial implications and some limitations
The results of this analysis support a number of past assumptions regarding the
performance of ISAs and provide some interesting insights into the link between institutional
and competitive diversity of the partnering firms and value creation. The results suggest the
necessity to explicitly consider the long-term strategic impact on the global position of the
firm, as well as the relational risk in the formation of ISAs, especially with partners from a
different economic, social and cultural origin.
These findings do not minimize the role of ISAs in creating valuable growth
opportunities. ISAs, and the options they provide to restructure operations globally, have
become building blocks of a new dynamic strategy concept. However, the value of an ISA
depends strongly on the volatility and competitive structure of global markets, the strategic
intent, bargaining power and organisational background of the partnering firms. Managers12
therefore need to make an explicit audit of these factors, integrate them with their own global
strategy, and learn to deal with uncertainty in a proactive sense, in order to maximize the
value of flexibility and long-term investment possibilities over time. This audit should be
integrated within the design of a scorecard from which the strategic, operational, relational
financial, and relational fitness can be continuously monitored and improved. The knowledge
that certain types of ISA demand specific attention in one or other dimension of the scorecard
should help to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of such a systematic approach
25. Our
study illustrates how the national / industrial context of partnering firms are key features that
relate closely to the value creation potential and, perhaps more importantly, to the value
enhancement and appropriation potential of the partnering firms. The results suggest that
investors expected an ISA between a Dutch firm and another European firm to strengthen the
firm’s market position in an integrating EU market, whereas a partnership with a
competitively strong and culturally distant Japanese partner was expected to generate negative
firm value, at least during the period 1985-1992. Using our results in a pro-active sense , we
may expect the forthcoming enlargement of the EU with ten Central and Eastern European
countries to create new profitable ISA opportunities for Dutch and other EU based firms.
Working with partners from different national origins tends to substantially increase
the relational risk, which, if unmanaged, may undermine the value creation potential of ISAs.
From a managerial perspective, our results therefore emphasize the need to better understand
and control relational risk. Partnering firms should develop the essential skills, including
understanding the partners’ strategic objectives and organizational culture, and not focus
solely on operational and/or financial targets. Moreover, to protect against competitive risks
and maximize the potential benefits of co-operation it is critical to develop clear joint
business purposes and to design a culture that is responsive to its environment and personnel
as well as granting operational and decision-making independence through which the partners
may enlarge the potential for co-operation. Incompatible cultural differences between partners
should be made explicit and, through organized dialogue and adapted management systems,
used in a constructive way to enhance co-operation
26.
In addition to the above-mentioned audit, a well-prepared plan should include well-
developed credible contingency plans with clear exit options if the co-operation fails to
achieve the desired objectives or operational effectiveness. Prior communication of these
plans will improve the valuation of the ISA by investors. Investors will react negatively to the
use of reactive or defensive ISAs to rationalize past management decisions and/or to13
compromise on competitive outcomes, as the latter type of ISA announcements will be
interpreted as unfavourable information about the firm’s future investment opportunities and
growth potential. Especially firms with a history of less successful ISAs may be sensitive to
such reactions, and should learn from past mistakes.
Finally, we point out some limitations of our study and offer suggestions for future
work. First, the nationality effect in our results encompasses both a competitiveness effect as
well as a relational risk effect. Building micro measures of relational risk and competitive
performance at the level of the individual partners
27 could help to disentangle these two
effects. Such research may also be used to explain the choice between equity and non-equity
ISAs in terms of relational and performance risk as well as illustrate the ownership stake of
the partners and the chosen governance mechanism in relation to the cultural and institutional
background of the partnering firms.
Second, while this study documents the diversity in stock market reactions for ISAs
with partners of different national origin, it needs to be emphasized that these reactions are
contingent upon the particular environmental conditions that prevailed during the period
1985-1992.14
Appendix I: data
The events correspond to the announcement in the Dutch financial press of formal
alliances between internationally operating firms during the period 1985-1992. The alliances
involve a long-term contract for co-operative development of new technologies or joint
marketing and/or production of goods and services. All types of alliances ranging from loose
contractual agreements to joint ventures are included. Confounding events, such as alliances
at the time of the October 1987 stock market crash, were eliminated from the sample.
Descriptions of the contents of the alliances and the actual announcement dates, as well as
stock market returns, were taken from specialised financial sources
28.
The selection procedure resulted in a total sample of 105 events. Of these 105 events,
44 involved the announcement of alliances for technological co-operation, while the other
cases concerned production and/or joint marketing alliances. As expected, the greatest
number of alliances (50) concerned alliances with West-European partners, mainly in
production and/or marketing. Further, the sample covered 24 alliances with US firms, 14
alliances with Japanese firms, and 17 alliances with firms based outside the Triad region,
mainly in other Asian countries.
More than 80 % of the alliances are horizontal co-operations with more than 70 % of
alliances involving partnering firms whose main activity was in the same industry sector (3
digit SIC-level). The majority of Dutch partners belong to three sectors: chemicals,
electronics and transport. In 60 % of the cases, the Dutch partner is more than twice the size
of the foreign partner
29.
The geographical scope of the alliance was not defined in 30 % of the cases. Of the
specified cases, 44 % had an unrestricted global scope, 8 % covered only the EU, while the
remaining 38 % included restrictions covering one country or a particular set of countries.15
TABLE 1
Cumulative abnormal returns following the announcement of an ISA distinguished by








































* Denotes significance at a level of 10 percent or lower16
TABLE 2
 Testing for differences in cumulative abnormal returns:  non-European partner versus
a European partner (base = EU partner, t-statistics in parentheses)



























2 = 0.15 R
2 = 0.29 R
2 = 0.13
F = 5.81* F = 5.32* F = 2.84*
* Denotes significance at a level of 10 percent or lower17
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